Abstracr-One of the challenges facing the networking indusby today is to increase the profitability of Internet services. This calls for economic mechanisms that can enable prosiders to charge more fur better services and collect n fair share of the increased revenues. In this paper. we present a generic model for pricing Internet services that are jointly offered by a group of providers. We show that non-cooperah've pricing stmtegies between providers may lead to Urrfair distribution of pro@ and inuy even discourage future upgrades to the network. As an afternative, we propose a fair revenue-sharing policy based on the weighted proportional fairness criterion. We show fhat this fair allocution policy encourages collaboration among providers and hence can produce higher profits for all providers. Based on the artdysis, we suggest a scalable algorithm for providers to implement this policy in a distributed way and study its convergence property.
1. INTRODUCTION One of the challenges facing the networking industry today is to increase the profitability of Internet skrvices.
For historical reasons, the current Internet protocol stack lacks support for implementing efficient market mechanisms. Consequently, service providers have limited economic incentives to invest in technology for new services that users may value more. This leads to a stagnant industry and limits the future evolution of the Internet. To correct this state of affairs, it is essential to implement economic mechanisms that would enable service providers to charge more for better services and collect a fair share of the increased revenues.
There are a number of recent papers that have explored pricing issues in networking. For propose pricing mechanistns that can be used for congestion control in the Internet. However, in many of such studies, prices are used mainly as a vehicle for passing state or control information in distributed algorithms.
Those prices are often fictitious instead of reflecting the actual value of the consumed network resources. In addition, those siudies assume that networks play the role of a social-welfare maximizer for end users and do not have their own interest. This assumption clearly does not match with the real situation in today's Internet, as most service providers are in the business for making profit and are only interested in their own welfare. Therefore, in this paper, we are interested in analyzing how providers' individual interest and their strategic interactions may affect the price of an Internet service, especially when it is jointly offered by a group of service providers. In addition to the analysis, we are also interested in designing pricing schemes that could improve providers' welfare, We believe that a good pricing scheme should be fair for all providers involved and encourage future upgrades to their networks. We also believe that a good pricing scheme should provide right incentives for the providers to follow the protocol and not to cheat for their own advantage. Finally, it should be scdable, i.e. suitable for large-scale deployment.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose a packet-marking based pricing scheme for networks with multiple service providers and present a generic model for the providers and the service they offer. In the subsequent two sections, we first study the case in which providers adopt non-cooperative pricing strategies. Through simple examples, we show that such strategies may result in undesirable outcomes. We then propose a fair revenue-sharing policy based on weighted proporrional fairness criterion. We show that b s policy is able to yield a better equilibrium, reachable through a distributed protocol. Finally, we conclude the paper with discussions on future work, 11. BASIC MODEL In today's Internet, there are many service providers, wluch may be classified into different categories based on the role they play in the Internet hierarchy. There are local and regional providers, which provide access service to the end users, and transit providers, which do not connect end users directly but provide connectivity among local and regional service providers. Because no single service provider has complete end-to-end coverage, all service providers have to work together, i.e.
forward each other's traffic, when offering an Internet service.
In this paper, we consider a generic Internet service offered by a group of interconnected service providers. This service has certain performance requirements, whch could be delay, packet loss probability, etc. For simplicity, we assume that those performance requirements could be translated into Eocal capacity constraints. For instance, the maximum utilization of each link by the traffic of premium service is limited to be less than, say, 40% to ensure that all packets of that service class experience only small delay when going through that link.
We assume that this service is offered on a set of routes, R. Each route is defined as an end-to-end path which traverses a sequence of service providers. Figure   1 illustrates such an example. in which route 1 originates at Provider 1 and terminates at Provider 2. Each provider on a route charges a price for its share o€ the service.
The end-to-end price of that route is then defined as the sum of these prices, or in short, the price of a route.
End users, each of which may have different utility from using the service, decide if they would use the service based on its price. In this paper, we do not explicitly model how this decision is made by individual users. Instead, we m u m e that in aggresate effect, the price of a route r , denoted by p , , controls the number of users on that route. This relationship is abstractly modelled by a demand function d r ( p r ) , which is strictly decreasing and differentiable, for all r E R.
To maintain the perfonnance requirements of the service, providers dynamically adjust their prices to regulate the demand on their links, There are different possible approaches to implement such a scheme, for applications with either fixed or elastic bandwidth requirements. For example, pricing for Voice over IP (VoIP) service could be implemented based on the following packet-marking idea. When a new VoIP connection is to be established, a control packet is sent from the originating host to inform the intended destination host. As this packet traverses a sequence of providers to the destination, each provider along the way marks the price it would like to charge in the header of the control packet. After t h s packet reaches the destination, the price information accumulated in the header is carried back to the originating host by an acknowledgement packet. The end user who initiated the connection then decides if she would proceed with the proposed end-to-end price. If she would, then the same price will be charged for the entire duration of the connection. For the providers, we assume certain mechanisms, e.g. some kind of clearing-house system, exist for them to collect revenues based on the amount of traffic they have forwarded and the prices they have set for those traffic.
Our model, however, does not depend on the specific aspects of an implementation or the nature of applications. We simply model that when a provider sets its price, its objective is to maximize its own profit, while maintaining the performance requirements for the service. The profit of a provider is its revenue from providing the service subtracted by the associated costs. Those costs, in abstraction, are proportional to bandwidth and may be modelled by a cost-per-unitbandwidth parameter, s. This choice of linear revenue and cost models is to approximate the generally complex relationships between price, cost and bandwidth in the region of interest, Therefore, in the case of only one provider offering the service, its choice of the optimal price can be solved from by the following constrained optimization program:
where C is the capacity of the provider's bottleneck Link, p is the price it charges for its service, and d ( p ) (p) requires that the demand is inelastic when price is low, but it becomes elastic when price increases. We believe the demand for Internet services possesses this property as well: when price is low, the demand is dominated by users' need to communicate; but once price passes a certain threshold, cost becomes a more important factor in users' decisions.
Before proceeding to the analysis of multiple-provider model, we make some additional assumptions, for both simplicity and ease of presentation. First, we assume that capacity bottlenecks are on links between providers only. This is because a provider's egress links are often purchased from its downstream providers and are likely to kcome saturated before its internal links do. There- fore, under this assumption, providers may be viewed as Iogical nodes connected by capacitated links between them. and a route is a sequence of inter-provider links that it traverses.
We also assume that a route between a sourcedestination pair is fixed and does not change with prices. We make this assumption because in today's Internet, routing between providers is often performed based on a set of business-oriented policies instead of short-term costs or performance measures. In addition, the prices in our schemes presumably fluctuate with traffic demand much faster than the time scale on which the providers change the routes.
NON-COOPERATIVE PRICING STRATEGIES
In this section, we assume there are a group of providers jointly offering the service on a set of routes.
Each provider chooses its price independentZy to maximize its own profit.
A, Fonnuluiiora
When the providers behave strategically, there is often conflict of interest, which may easily lea$ to inefficient and/or unfair outcomes. For instance, in the scenario shown in Figure 1 naturally into the "best-response" framework of Nash games.
In our formulation, a provider's payoff and strategies are modelled by the following program: 
Due to non-cooperative behaviors of players, equilibria in Nash games are often inefficient or even have undesirable properties. In the next section, we study a simple example and show that non-cooperative pricing stratesy may lead to unfair distribution of revenues among providers. Moreover, a provider with bottleneck links may not have incentives to upgrade its capacity.
B. Example
Consider two providers connected by a single link in tandem, and there is only one route going through them. The demand on that route is d ( y l + p 2 ) , where pi is the price chaged by provider i(i = 1;2). Without loss of generality, we assume C1 > C2. so that provider 2 is always the bottleneck. In addition, the cost of carrying traffic, s, is the same for both providers. The resulting Nash game played by the two providers is:
Provider 1:
Provider 2:
It is easy to show that this game has a unique Nash q u i librium, We first consider the case when the capacity constraint in (3) is not active at equilibrium. By symmetry, the prices charged by the two providers at equilibrium must be the same. This price may be solved from the first- Now consider the case where C p I X*+ i.e. the capacity constraint of Provider 2 is active at equilibrium. 
Revenues collected by two providers at the equilibrium.
We first show that in this case Provider 2 always charges a hgher price than Provider 1 does, hence collects more 
From the optimality condition for provider 1, we get
By (5) and (6), the above inequalities imply that 2pl < pl 3-pa, or p1 < p z . This calculation shows that the provider with the smalier capacity always makes more profit, which we believe is unfair. Note that the ratio between the prices is p z / p~ = #/(s+y(K)) -1. So the smaller C2 is, the larger K is, hence the higher the ratio is. If C2 is fixed, then the more elastic the demand is, the faster y(K) decays with K , and the higher the ratio is.
Next we consider the providers' incentive in upgrading their links. When there is only one provider, as described by (l), the profit J always increases with the capacity C, as long as the capacity constraint is active. This is because from optimization theory [7] , we know that the Lagrangian multiplier p, which is positive in that case, indicates the sensitivity of the profit J w.r.t to the capacity C. However. this result may no longer hold with two providers applying non-cooperative pricing strategy. Consider the sensitivity of Provider 2's profit w.r. and cost s = 0.1, It can be clearly seen that a maximum is achieved before C;! moves into the unconstrained region.
In summary, the results in this section have significant practical implications. They tell us that if providers apply non-cooperative pricing strategy, those with bottleneck links have an unfair advantage in getting more profits than their peers. Consequently, to keep benefiting from this unfair advantage, they may not have an incentive to upgrade their links. This obviously would limit the evolution of the entire network.
IV. REVENUE SHARING POLICY
Given the undesirable properties of non-cooperative pricing strategy, it is then natural to ask if better pricing schemes could be designed to overcome those drawbacks and yet still be compatible with providers' interest (i.e. they have no incentive to cheat). Game theory itself provides many useful theories and solution concepts for such types of design problems. Possible approaches may include mechanism design and cooperative game theory ([5J 161). However. those theories and concepts often are too difficult, if not impossible, to compute and implement in a decentralized way. As an alteinative, we adopt the weighted proportional fairness criterion and propose a fair revenue-sharins policy for providers to improve their profits. We first study how providers would behave under this policy, and then suggest a scalable algorithm for providers to reach that equilibrium.
A. Fuir Altocarion of Revenue
When providers realize the undesirable outcomes produced by non-cooperative pricing strategy, they understand that they have incentives to collaborate and irnprove their own benefits together. Possibly. they would reach some agreement on how to distribute revenues among themselves, instead of "competing" against each other €or revenues, In that case, the foremost question to be answered is what agreement, among all the feasible ways of allocating the revenues, would providers reach among themselves.
For an allocation acceptable to all providers, we believe that ideally it should possess at least the following properties. First, it should be Pareto efficient, i.e. there is no other allocation that can offer better payoff for mely provider involved. Second, this allocation should not depend on the scale by which the providers' profits are measured, nor the order of the providers' indices.
One fairness criterion that meets the above requirements is the so-called weighted proportionally fair allocation 181, which is a generalization of Nash's bargaining solution [9] . At this allocation, all providers make equal (weighted) proportional compromise in their payoffs (hence its name). Mathematically, it is the solution at whtch E, w t A J a / J z < 0, where AJ, is any feasible deviation in provider i's payoff Ji and wz is its associated weight (i.e. its bargaining power). In other words, under any feasible deviation from this allocation, there must be at least one provider whose percentage change in payoff has to be sacrificed for some others' gains. This deviation hence would not be acceptable, as it would violate the efficiency property, By th~s criterion, the solution to the weighted proportionaIly fair allocation may be found by maximizing the following objective function (in its general form): C, wtlog(Ja).
However, in the context of our model, a direct application of the weighted proportional fairness criterion may not always yield sensible solutions. The scenario depicted in Figure 3 is such an example. In this case, one backbone provider is connected to N access providers. It is easy to verify that, under the assumption y(p) is decreasing, this program has a unique solution:
What this indicates is that, on each route, the access provider gets N times more revenue than the backbone provider does. Moreover, the more routes the backbone provider serves, the less share of the revenues per route it is able to get. Obviously, this is not a fair ageement that the backbone provider would accept.
The reason for this insensible allocation is that, in our model, the negotiation is dictated by two kinds of comprise. First, on a route traversing through a sequence of providers, these providers negotiate how to share the revenues collected from this route, according to their respective contributions. Second, for a provider carrying traffic on multiple routes, because of its capacity constraint, it needs to negotiate with others on how to allocate its capacity among different routes, or equivalently, the end-to-end price of the routes it serves, For example, in the scenario described in Section III.A, Provider 1 and 2 not only negotiate on how to split p1 d ( y l ) , but also a pair of 111 and yz that are acceptable to both of them.
In the rest of this section, we propose a fair allocation scheme that takes both intra-and inter-route negotiations into consideration. We first show that end-to-end prices do not affect the negotiation on individual routes. We then propose a scalable algorithm for finding fair endto-end prices.
Suppose ( y r , T E R) is a set of end-to-end prices that the providers would agree on. Then consider the negotiation between the providers on route 7'. We assume that in the negotiation, the higher cost a provider has in forwarding traffic, the more barsaining power it has. We model h s assumption by assigning si as the weight tui for the providers. With profit as a provider's payoff, the weighted proportionally fair allocation on route can be found as the solution to the following program:
The solution is unique and can be expressed in terms of profit-to-cost ratio as the following:
This result first implies that under weighted proportional fair allocation, each provider's profit is equally proportional to its cost. Since the ratios in (9) can also be interpreted as return on investment rate, we believe this allocation is more pragmatic and more likely to be accepted by the service providers. Secondly, it implies that on any route, end-to-end prices do not influence providers' relative share of revenues. This fact thus allows us IO fix the allocation ratio on each route when computing fair end-to-end prices. We assume that providers negotiate the end-to-end prices based on their ford profit. Moreover, each route is assumed to have the same significance in the negotiation.
Then proportionally fair end-to-end prices may be found from solving the following program:
Unfortunately, this program in general cannot be separated in its decision variables and hence is difficult to solve by distributed algorithms.
To get around this difficulty, we propose to trade efficiency for scalability. More specifically, instead of finding the fair end-to-end prices hy a centralized progran1 as in (IO), we propose to have the providers reach an agreement through localized learning. On each route, providers agree to share the revenue according the rule in (9). For the end-to-end prices, each provider LRimtza 4.1: For any given strategy profile of other providers, {p-lT. 1 f Ei, 'I' E RI}, a unique maximizer for (1 I) exists.
Proojl Note that because there is no active capacity constraint on internal links, routes existing through independently chooses its local price (i.e. pir> in a way that when combined with those of others, the resulting end-to-end prices would maximize its own total profit. In game-theoretic terms, this agreement is the outcome of a Nash game played between the providers, with each provider's allocated profit as its payoff and their local prices as strategies. Note that the difference between this game and that described by 12) is that in th~s game, a provider's local price does not directly determines its revenue and profit. Instead, they are decided by other providers' choices as well, through the allocation rule specified in (9).
In the next section, we present a formulation of this game and then show that it has an equilibrium (hence an agreement can be reached). In addition, we show that this equilibrium can be reached via a distributed learning algorithm. 
B. Equilibrium a i d Its

(12)
Now define trr through the following fixed-point equaIntuitively, tir is the optimal end-to-end price for route T , preferred by provider i, regardless of the prices chosen by other providers on that route. So (12) can be rewritten Mathematically, on a route T , after the providers on that route have chosen their local prices. the resulting totaI revenues are distributed to each provider in proportion to its cost, according to the rule in (9). For provider i, the profit generated from route T on its link 1, denoted Jl,, hence is has a to (l I)-
IfE, E T E R , J h (~h ' ;~-k~
(1 1)
First of all. we are interested in whether an equilibrium exists in this game, i.e. whether the providers would reach a revenue-sharing agreement under this new policy. Theorem 4 J : Nash equilibrium exists for the game specified in (1 1) So we have tion, since S2 # SI.
x i ! , gk), j 2 2. BY applying the same argument to y2, we get y2 = 0. This procedure is repeated until j = J-1 to get p.7-1 = 0 and y~ = SJ.
This result impties that price on all links except those in AJ should be set zero. If there is only one Iink in A J , then the price for that link should be S J , Otherwise, to avoid ambiguity, we fix a tie-breakmg rule that only the most upstream Iink in AJ sets its price to S J , while the rest of the links in AJ set zero price.
I
Reinark By the definition of tdr, if on two links vi and n, the ratio pm/s, > ,un/sn. then t,, > tnr. Here the ratio ,ul/sl is the normalized sensitivity of provider 2's profit on route T w.r.t. the capacity of link 1. Hence it also indicates how well the demands are served on this link, or in more intuitive terms, how congested this link is. Therefore, this lemma implies that only the most congested link can set the total price for a route. For comparison, consider the case where all the links are y j = S2, which clearly is a contradicWlth ~1 = 0, (1 5 ) cu be reduced to pj = max{ 0, Sjowned by a single provider. The optimal end-to-end price for route r in that case is
where Als are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the capacity constraints. So all links set a marginaI price based on its own degree of congestion, and it is the s m of all these prices, not the I~I~X L ' I I~W~ of them, that determines the optimal end-to-end price pr .
Another implication from h s leinma is that given any feasible p, the set of end-to-end prices are completely determined. In this sense, one may view fi as the onIy strategy played in the game. So next weuse this argument to prove the existence of equilibrium.
Consider the mapping fi : ,u 4 P I , i.e. the bestresponse of link I in pl given theset of Lagrangian multipliers on other links. p. By the previous two lemmas, this mapping is one-to-Ge. Moreover, it is easy to verify that jl (,u) 
The gash equilibrium, if exists, is the solution to the following system of fixed-point equations:
To show the existence of thls solution, by Brouwer's fixed-point theorem, we need to show the mapping defined through (16) is continuous.
Lemma 4.3:
The mapping defined in (16) is continu-
ous.
Proof: Please see Appendix. B This lemma concludes the proof for the theorem.
The proof for the existence of equilibrium can also be used to show that under this fair revenue-allocation agreement, providers always have incentives to upgrade their links, as long as there is unserved demand (i.e. their links' capacity constraints are active). Consider any provider with a constrained link, say, indexed by 1. Then define R1. 1 as the set of routes whose end-to-end prices are set by link E , and RQ as the rest of routes traversing through link E. i.e. RQ = RI \ Rl.1. Because the total price for a route is determined by the maximum of p k / s k , k E I,,-, routes in Rz.2 are not affected by any increase in Cl at all, because 8yl/BCl < 0. Moreover,
infinitesimal increase in Ci does not change the members in Therefore, aJ,*/aCL = pi > 0, i.e. increase in Ci will increase provider 2's profit as long as pi > 0.
Since providers always have incentive to upgrade their links under fair-allocation agreement. eventually the network will move into the capacity region in which none of the links is constrained. In that case. pricing of the routes is no longer coupled through capacity constraints. As a result, the fair revenue allocation problem reduces to that for a single-route case: each provider collects its share of revenue as specified by (91, and the optimal end-to-end price for a route is determined from the profit maximization €or that route, i.e. pr = arg maxll>o { ( p -zlCLv sl) d,(p) 1. So our Nash-game based scheme would produce the same allocation as the general rule (11) would. By the Pareto efficiency of proportionally fair allocation. thc profit for each provider in this case Pareto dominates (i.e. is higher than or at least equal to) that produced by non-cooperative pricing strategy.
C. Irtipleitien tation
The proof on the existence of equilibrium also suggests a distributed algorithm €or reaching it. First, Lemma 14 suggests that the optimal end-to-end price for a route is determined by the link with the largest scaled Lagrangian multiplier (i.e. p/s), among those it traverses. Lemma 12 shows that the duality gap for the local optimization program is zero, so these Lagrangian multipliers can be computed iteratively based on the traffic load on the links. Based on these observations, we propose the following algorithm:
Each provider maintains a state variable pl €or each link 1, which is updated periodically according to the following rule: Control packets, or packets involved in the pricing procedure (depend on the actuaI implementation), have two dedicated fields in their headers. These fields are used to carry information about p/s and Emsm, and are initiated to zero when the originating host sends such a packet. As the packet passes through a link on its route to destination, the router on that link updates the first field only if the local link has a larger scaled Lagrangian multiplier, i.e. p./s := max(p/s, p l / q } . It updates the second field by E, s, := E, sm + SI.
After [he packet reaches its destination, the values recorded in these two fields are returned to the sending host via either an ACK packet or some special control packet.
We assume that a first-hop provider is able to keep some estimates of the demand on each route that initiates from its network. When it receives an ACK or control packet returned from a destination, it first computes the new optimal price by solving p* = E,, snz + p/s + yip'). and then updates the price for the corresponding route accordingly.
Subsequent data packets in the estabhhed connection are stamped with the current end-to-end price p' and the total cost Cs, of the route. In actual implementation, for applications with fixedbandwidth requirement, lhese variables could be the same as those initially posted to the users when the connection is established; for applications with elastic bandwidth requirement, these variables may change from packet to packet to reflect the instantaneous demands for the service. As these data packets pass through a sequence of providers on the route, each provider records its share of the revenue p* sl/ E, s, for forwafding them. We assume that there is some system (e.g. a clearing house) established for the providers to collect or distribute the total revenues, presumably on a time scale much longer than that of the dynamics of the traffic.
Note that cost parameter s generally is a piece of information private to individual providers. To prevent cheating, parameter s used in this algorithm may not need to be its actual value. Instead, it could be a value negotiated in advance among the providers and hence indicates the bargaining power of different providers.
In this algorithm, onIy the first-hop providers need to keep state information for each of its routes, and if necessary, the on-going price charged €or each flow. This is feasible because at edge of the Internet, the number of active flows and routes is relatively small, and providers have to maintain that information for charging purpose anyway. By the continuity of ,&,
Since APPENDIX Before we proceed to the proof for Lemma 4.3, we first prove a short lemma that will be used later in the proof. where & ( t ) is the total amount of data scheduled to user i by time t. In contrast to mmt previous work we assume that the channel conditions are defined by an adversary rather than a stationary, stochastic process. W e give lower bounds on how competitive a n online algorithm can he and show that the bounds are nearly matched by a simple randomized algorithm. We also consider a situation in which packets with associated profits are injected into a network of servers. We wish to schedule the packets in the network and maximize the profit of data that reaches its destination. We show that if the servers are allowed to exchange control packets that inform each other of the congestion in the network then we can approximate the optimum profit arbitrarily closely, We also show that without these control packets this is not possible. Our results are motivated by recent work on primal-dual algorithms for flow control in networks, The key difference between our approach and this previous work is that we take into account the scheduling dynamics in the network.
Keywords: System design, Stochastic processcs/queueing theory.
r. INTRODUCTION
Most work on packet scheduling assumes that the traffic injected into a network does not U priori overload any of the servers in that network. In this case a typical objective is to achieve stubility, i.e. we want all the packets to reach their destinations in a bounded amount of time, However. many data applications offer elastic traffic to a data network. This means that the application is able io send as much data as the network can h a d l e . In this situation we can think of the network as being overloaded and we wish to choose which data to serve, We assume that all data has an associated profit and we wish to maximize the total profit that is served.
In this paper we consider two models that examine problems of h i s type. We first consider a model of a single server scheduling data over time-varying channels. This can be used to model data transmission in wireless networks, We then consider a model in which an adversary injects packets into a queueing network. Each packet has a fixed path and a profit. Our aim is to choose which packets to serve and then schedule these packets through the network.
il. Em@-varying clzannels
We consider a single server that serves a set of n. users. Each user has a queue that is infinitely backlogged, i.e. it always has data to serve. At each time step t , the server is given a rate vector (~~( t j , r l ( t , ) , . . . )rn-1(t.)) and the server must pick a user to serve. If user i is picked for service then data of size ri(t) is served out of the queue for user i. Let zi(t) = 1 if user i is picked for service at time 1 and q ( t ) = 0 otherwise.
Let EZi(t) be the total amount of data served to user i by time t, i.e. Ri(t) = Ct,.,tri(f.)zi(d This model is often used to model data transmissions in wireless networks. For example, suppose hat we have a single basestation that wishes to transmit data to multiple mobile users. In Qualcomm's HDR system [I] , all of the mobiles in a cell measure the quality of the signal from rhe basestation in each time step. The mobiles calculate the rate at which they can receive data and report this rate back to the basestadon.
The basestation chooses a user to serve based on this rate information. The model that we have defined closely matches this scenario.
This model has recently received a great deal of attention in the context of sfationmy, sfochaslic channel processes. This means that there is an underlying stationary, stochastic process such as an ergodic Markov Chain and at the each time step the rate vector depends on the current state of the stochastic process. In this work the throughput is updated as an exponentially smoothed average, i.e. we define a rate @ ( t ) by Rf(t) = (1 -fi)Rr(t -1) + prr(t)za(t) rather than R,(t) = &(t -1) -t ri(t)xi(t 
